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MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

WILLS-PRETERMITTED HEIR STATUTE-INCORPORATION BY REFER-

ENCE-Plaintiff, adopted daughter of' Mr. and Mrs. Burdick, deceased, left
them some years before their deatps. Mr. Burdick provided in his will that
plaintiff was to get two legacies, and Mrs. Burdick, who died after her husband, did not specifically mention plaintiff, but provided that the residue of her
estate should be distributed as provided in her husband's will. She subsequently
revoked this provision by a codicil which gave the residue to one Langley.
Plaintiff claimed a share of the estate under the Arkansas "pretermitted child"
statute.1 Held, Mrs. Burdick's reference to her husband's will incorporated it
into her own will, and this was sufficient mention of plaintiff to preclude her
claiming, by virtue of the statute, a share, as pretermitted child, of her foster
mother's estate. The codicil revoking the incorporating provision did not serve

1

Ark. Stat. (Pope, 1937) §§ 14524, 14525.
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to delete the will incorporated by reference, but left it as a provision of testatrix's
will which, although of no effect in passing property, was still a part of the will.
Kinnean,. Langley, (Ark. 1946) 192 S.W. (2d) 978. ·
It is well to keep in mind the basic policy which has brought about the various "pretermitted heir" statutes. In general, it can be said that in the United
States, the policy is to provide for ·those cases where the testator through inadvertance has failed to include one of his children or their descendants in his will.2
Arkansas is one of the states whose statute 8 presumes that children born prior to
the execution of the will have been pretermitted if not mentioned therein, either
as a class or individually."' The case of Gerrish v. Gerrish t1 is represented as on
all fours with the principal case on the question of incorporation by reference of a
document mentioning an otherwise unmentioned child. In that case testatrix's
husband by his will had provided that she was to have a life interest in his residuary estate and on her death it was to go to his children and the children of
deceased children. All testatrix said in her will was that personal property left
her £or life by her husband should be distributed as he directed in his will. A
casual examination should show that actually this provision was ineffective to
pass any property. The Oregon court held that this was sufficient reference to
the husband's will to incorporate its provisions into testatrix's will, and therefor,
the children took nothing as pretermitted heirs. Still, it can fairly be said that she
was not unmindful of her children in that she referred to a dispositive provision
in their favor. In the principal case, there was a trust in favor of testatrix for
life, and at her death, part of it was to be paid to plaintiff, but it does not appear
from the report that testatrix referred specifically to this fund in her will. The
incorporating provision reads: "All other property of which I may die seized,
either real or personal, shall revert back to the estate of my deceased husband,
George H. Burdick, and shall be distributed as provided in his last will and testament." 6 Whether testatrix has property of her own to which she referred here
is not apparent, nor is her husband's will sufficiently reported to indicate just
what disposition would have been made of the estate had this provision remained
effective, but aside from the gift after the trust for life mentioned above, the only
time plaintiff is mentioned in Mr. Burdick's will is in one provision which gives
her one dollar directly. The principal• case can be clearly distinguished from the
Gerrish case in that there is no specific mention of a dispositive provision in
favor of the child. In that case, Prim, J., said: "This portion of the will of
James Gerrish is clearly referred to in the will of the testatrix, and the provisions
thereof adopted as a portion of her will." 7 Certainly, the Oregon court treated
only the provisions specifically referred to as incorporated in the later will. One
z Mathews, "Pretermitted Heirs: An Analysis of Statutes," 29 CoL. L. REv. 748
at 750 (1929).
3
Ark. Stat. (Pope, 1937) § 14525.
"'Mathews, "Pretermitted Heirs: An Analysis of Statutes," 29 CoL. L. REv. 748
at 752. In the case of Yeates v. Yeates, 179 Ark. 543, 16 S.W. (2d) 996 (1929), it
appeared that some mention was made of children, but it was not clear to the court just
how many children were referred to by the testator. The court held that since the
number of children referred to was indefinite, the wilL was ambiguous so far as they
were concerned, and they took as pretermitted heirs.
ti 8 Ore. 351 (1880).
8
Principal case at 979.
7
Gerrish v. Gerrish, 8 Ore. 351 at 353 (1880).
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may incorporate part of another's will 8 and it would seem that that was just _
what was done in these two cases. But perhaps the biggest hurdle the court has
to cross is the revocation by codicil of this, the only clause in testatrix's will,
which can possibly be said to refer to plaintiff. This leap the court makes by
saying that while the dispositive provisions are nullified, the clause itself is not
deleted nor erased from the will, but rather goes along with the rest of the
instrument, carrying with it necessarily the document which it incorporated by
reference. Such a revoked provision is ignored in construing and interpreting the
will, but continues to exist in fact. It would seem somewhat easier to reach this
conclusion if the child were actually mentioned in the particular clause which
for some reason or other became inoperative, as is the situation in a Rhode
Island 9 decision cited in the principal case; but here the effect of the codicil is to
revoke a provisi9n which disposes of property, which disposition incorporates an
alien document, which document incidentally mentions plaintiff! It is certainly
true that a child is not pretermitted if, though mentioned in the will, he is given
nothing. 10 And the position of the court here is that the effect of the incorporation and subsequent revocation by codicil is the "same as if Mrs. Burdick had
said, 'I name my adopted daughter, Hazel Burdick, but leave her nothing.' " 11
Granting the incorporation of Mr. Burdick's will, this construction might not be
too far-fetched. But the revocation effectively removes the prior will from
consideration and would seem to delete plaintiff's name at the same time, if indeed it was ever a part of testatrix's will. "If a codicil contains an express revocation clause, it revokes such provisions of the will as are specified in such revocation clause." 12 The intention of the testatrix should certainly rule, but it is
impossible to say just what provision she would have made had she known that
her daughter was still living. It appears that the Arkansas statute 18 is directed
toward such a situation as this, in that it is one of the jurisdictions where the
unmentioned prior born child is presumed to be pretermitted. 14 Plaintiff's name
is as effectively deleted as if the incorporating provision were erased physically.
"Under our statutes no reference is made to the intention of the testator and
therefore, the child •.• takes his intestate share where he is not expressly mentioned in the will or referred to as a class." 15

Shubrick T. Kothe
8

1 PAGE, WILLS, 3d ed.,§ 266, note 5 (1941).
Faucher v. Bouchard, 47 R.I. 150, 131 A. 556 (1926).
10 1 PAGE, WILLS, 3d ed., § 528 (1941).
11 Principal case at 983.
12
l PAGE, WILLS, 3d ed., § 468 at p. 855 (1941).
18
Ark. Stat. (Pope, 1937) § 14525.
14
See note 4, supra. Another recent Arkansas decision, Taylor v. Cammack, (Ark.
1946) 193 S.W. (2d) 323, held that a reference to "heirs" was sufficient mention of
children born prior to the execution of the will to preclude the application of the
statute. A possible explanation of these decisions may be that the Arkansas court is
seeking to relieve against a statute, the effect of which is to create an unnatural presumption. It would seem that where children born prior to the execution of a will are
omitted, it is probable that they were not included because the testator intended not to
include them, rather than because he forget them.
15
Meriwhether, "Pretermitted Child Statutes," 8 UNIV. ARK. L. S. Bul. 64 at
65 (1940).
9

